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Summary 
This paper investigates how, when and why community-based strategies are effective in promoting corporate 
accountability to the poor. It argues that mainstream approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
underestimate the importance of power in the relationship between corporations and the communities they 
invest in, which limit their applicability to many developing country contexts in particular. In helping to 
address this neglect we draw on literatures on power, accountability and citizen participation in order to 
analyse 46 cases where communities have attempted to hold corporations to account for their social and 
environmental responsibilities. The paper argues that more attention should be paid to a number of state-, 
corporation- and community-related factors, which are found to be key to the effectiveness of strategies 
aimed at providing corporate accountability to the poor. 
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1  Introduction 
The background to this paper lies in the changing relationships between states, corporations and communities 
over the last decade. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have increased in size, reach and power largely as a 
result of the processes of deregulation and privatisation associated with economic globalisation (Scholte 2000). 
Approximately 60,000 TNCs and 500,000 foreign affiliates invest more than US$600 billion abroad annually, 
and control two thirds of international trade, making them ‘central organisers of the emerging global 
economy’ (Hansen 2002: 159). Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at rates above those of GNP and 
exports, and has been increasingly important relative to official aid flows to developing countries during the 
1990s. It is the transnationalisation of resource extraction in particular, however, that brings multinational 
companies into contact with communities. As Lund-Thomsen notes:  
 
Encouraged by market and foreign investment-led philosophies, developing countries have liberalised 
mining and investment laws as well as rewritten their tax codes to facilitate the participation of TNCs in 
their mineral economies. Combined with technological advances and favourable metal prices, new 
regions have been opened for mineral exploration by TNCs. This development has inevitably brought 
TNCs into conflict with local communities (2003: 2). 
 
Parallel to this, there has been a general shift away from the “command and control” regulatory role of the 
state that characterised approaches to environmental regulation of TNCs throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
towards more informal, voluntary and corporate “self-regulation” (Hansen 2002). Increasingly multilateral and 
bilateral donors, as well as a growing number of business associations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), have portrayed TNCs as key partners in delivering “sustainable development”. For example, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) refers to the “key role” corporations play ‘in making 
globalisation work better for poor people’ (DFID 2000: 59). Market-based approaches are regarded as more 
effective solutions to environmental problems than formal “command and control” mechanisms (World Bank 
2000). Corporate voluntarism and strategies of partnership, which are at the heart of mainstream CSR 
approaches, are regarded as “win-win”, whereby the social and environmental performance of the firm is 
increased and corporations benefit from increased efficiency, productivity and enhanced reputation 
(Elkington 1998). Following Newell (2002), this will be termed the “liberal” CSR approach as it relies on a 
laissez-faire approach to the question of business regulation.  
In contrast, critics have regarded the growing power of TNCs as a threat to democratic governance 
(Korten 1995) where the rights of capital increasingly trump those of other actors. Gill refers to this as the 
“new constitutionalism”:  
 
In effect, new constitutionalism confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate 
capital, whilst constraining the democratisation process that has involved struggles for representation for 
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hundreds of years. Central, therefore, to new constitutionalism is the imposition of discipline on public 
institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the property rights and entry and exit options of 
holders of mobile capital with regard particular political jurisdictions. 
(Gill 1995: 413) 
 
While deregulation and liberalisation have increased the entry and exit rights of TNC investment, critics argue 
that, in contrast, the social and environmental responsibilities of TNCs are underdeveloped (Newell 2001a). A 
democratic deficit then emerges where the global mobility and rights that companies have acquired is not 
matched by systems of regulation to govern their activities. The same pattern of mobility also allows 
companies in some sectors to relocate more easily, playing governments and workers off against one another 
in an effort to secure the best terms. This makes it more difficult for poorer communities to demand 
accountability from such companies. 
It is these differences in power, assets and capacities between corporations and communities that form 
the background to this paper. While corporations secure access to decision-making and privilege through their 
contributions to state resources through taxes, and to economic development more generally by providing 
employment, the communities in which many TNCs invest, by contrast are often far removed from the 
centres of political power as well as economically marginalised. Given the growing emphasis in mainstream 
donor agendas on the positive role of corporations in delivering development, it is important to understand 
the contexts in which the poor encounter multinational companies, in situations of sharp political and 
economic inequality more familiar to the majority of the world’s people than scenarios of partnership and 
engagement emphasised in the “liberal” CSR literature. By focusing on community-based strategies for 
accountability and the factors that shape them, we are not attempting to romanticise, as some activist accounts 
tend to, the plight of disenfranchised communities struggling against evil multinational companies. Nor are we 
suggesting that this form of action is either the most desirable or likely to be the most effective in the short 
term in enhancing corporate accountability (CA). Rather, our aim is to draw attention to the significance of 
these self-help strategies for corporate accountability that are often adopted by people without access to 
political representation and systems of redress in contexts where state-based regulation is weak and 
unenforced, where international law is rarely respected and where corporate responsibility an alien concept. 
These encounters between companies and communities constitute an important interface in the global 
struggle to promote corporate accountability, imbued with history, and representing the terms on which many 
of the world’s poorest people enter this debate.  
The central question that this paper seeks to address is: under what conditions are community-based 
strategies for corporate accountability successful in engendering a greater element of accountability on the part 
of corporations to the communities in which they invest? In this context, effectiveness will be taken to mean 
whether the mechanisms of accountability are successful in (i) improving the responsiveness of corporations to 
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community demands, gauged in terms of a change in practice as opposed merely to rhetorical shifts, and (ii) 
increasing the representation of previously marginalised groups through heightening their access to or inclusion 
in decisions affecting their lives. The paper contributes to debates about the role of the private sector in 
development and more generally to contemporary concerns with corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (CSER). We argue, however, that the mainstream discourse of CSER, by overemphasising 
notions of partnership, best practice and philanthropy, pays insufficient attention to the politics of corporate 
accountability and the influence of power on how mechanisms of accountability and spaces for citizen 
participation in CSR initiatives work in practice.  
The analysis draws upon literatures on accountability and participation in order to demonstrate the 
importance of power for understanding the nature of relationships between communities, corporations and 
states, and to provide a framework for identifying the key factors that influence the effectiveness of 
community-based strategies for corporate accountability. Our study inevitably focuses on the ways in which 
people resist corporate misconduct as opposed to the many cases of “best practice” that are well covered in 
the literature, promoted by bodies such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and 
highlighted in policy initiatives such as Business Partners for Development.  
Evidence from 46 case studies of community-company relations is drawn upon, but the broader 
framework describes trends observed in over 80 cases. For the most part, the case study material is based on a 
range of secondary academic and activist sources. Given the impossibility of verifying first-hand the accuracy 
of all claims made in these sources, it should be evident that in citing allegations we are not endorsing claims, 
but reporting them for the purpose of analysing the claims around which people mobilise and how companies 
react. Though predominantly from Southern settings, we include examples from poor communities in the 
North, given that many of the problems communities have in holding corporations to account result from 
poverty and inequality rather than geographical location. We also include examples that pre-date the 
contemporary Western-oriented framing of the CSR debate. What may be labelled CSR issues today are often 
a product of many decades of conflict over resources that constitute ongoing historical struggles for corporate 
and state accountability and should be understood in this context.  
The paper analyses cases in which communities have attempted to hold corporations accountable for the 
ways in which their actions impinge upon livelihood issues such as land rights, occupational and family health 
and the environment, across a range of sectors including mining, forestry, oil extraction and waste dumping. It 
therefore goes beyond the popular but narrower framing of CSR as responsible management of 
environmental outputs and respect for basic labour standards at the workplace. Combining lessons from the 
conceptual framework with analysis of the cases, we argue that a number of “state-related”, “company-
related” and “community-related” factors are key to understanding the effectiveness of community-based 
strategies for CA. 
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The next section examines literatures on CSR, power, accountability and participation in order to identify 
the factors that are likely to influence the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA under different 
conditions. Section 3 draws on a number of case studies to analyse the ways in which government-related 
factors influence the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA. Section 4 draws on case studies to 
analyse how company-related factors influence the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA. 
Section 5 draws on case studies to analyse how community-related factors influence the effectiveness of such 
strategies. Section 6 brings together the main findings from the preceding analyses, and offers some 
conclusions. 
 
2  From responsibility to accountability 
Various terms have been used to describe the rights and obligations of corporations. Corporate governance refers 
to policies and practices used to regulate internal relationships and fulfil responsibilities to investors and other 
stakeholders. Corporate accountability (CA) has been used, in a managerial sense, to refer to issues of disclosure, 
auditing and monitoring of business practices (Zadek et al. 1997). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) implies a 
more discretionary act on the part of companies as they consider their role and impact across a wide range of 
corporate activities; while corporate citizenship, positions corporations as “citizens” with claims to the 
entitlements and responsibilities that flow from citizenship (Newell 2002). Looser definitions focus on the 
expectations of good citizenship. For Zadek (2001: 151): ‘A civil corporation is one that takes full advantage 
of opportunities for learning and action in building social and environmental objectives into its core business 
model by effectively developing its internal values and competencies.’  
Unlike understandings of corporate accountability as management practice, we are more concerned here 
with the political content of accountability relationships. This more political interpretation of accountability 
chimes with traditional preoccupations about ‘how to keep power under control . . . how to prevent its abuse, 
how to subject it to certain procedures and rules of conduct’ (Schedler 1999: 13). Central to this definition of 
accountability are the concepts of “answerability” – an obligation to provide an account of one’s actions and 
inactions, and “enforceability” – mechanisms for realising that obligation and sanctioning its non-fulfilment 
where necessary (Schedler 1999). Understanding accountability in these terms, it becomes possible to see that 
while there has been an increase in answerability, as firms increasingly feel obliged to validate their actions to 
wider circles of stakeholders and those affected by their activities, mechanisms of meaningful enforceability 
are often weak and underdeveloped (Newell 2003b).  
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2.1 Limitations of the “liberal” corporate social responsibility agenda 
From an accountability perspective, the “liberal” CSR approach has a number of limitations. Firstly, many of 
the debates on CSR focus on initiatives such as voluntary codes of conduct and standards, where 
accountability mechanisms are created in a top-down fashion. Relatively little attention is focused on the 
strategies that communities themselves undertake to demand CA. This is problematic when civil governance 
describes a ‘process through which rules are built that companies are willing to be accountable to’ (Zadek 2001: 
101; emphasis added). The focus is on voluntarism from above rather than rights from below. 
Secondly, while existing literatures help to identify some of the pressures driving companies’ 
answerability to communities, there is insufficient emphasis on how the importance of these factors may vary 
according to context. Murphy and Bendell (1997: 218) argue that the prerequisites for strong partnerships in a 
Northern context include (i) media and public concern and company vulnerability to these; (ii) an organised 
civil society movement with enough finance, commitment and adequate level of competence; and (iii) genuine 
commitment of all parties to the partnership process. These are demanding prerequisites, which, in some 
contexts, particularly in the South and poorer communities in the North, may not exist. The vulnerability of 
different companies to these pressures varies according to which markets companies are producing for and in 
turn, whether concerned customers in those markets have sufficient purchasing power to bring about a 
change in company behaviour.  
A third problem is that much of the emphasis on partnership and negotiation is apolitical, and lacks a 
theory of power. For example, the World Bank describes how, ‘communities take their place at the negotiating 
table along with regulators and factory managers’ (World Bank 2000: 3), with no discussion of the range of 
challenges that communities may face in securing their place and then being in a position to realise the 
advantages it confers. Power dynamics continue to be important even once a supposedly equal place at the 
table has been negotiated. A focus on negotiation, joint agenda-setting and partnership suggests that all 
agendas can be accommodated. This assumes a position of leverage on behalf of the community with the 
capacity and confidence to participate effectively (Cornwall 2000). It also overlooks the strategies that can be 
employed by the powerful to control the agenda and frame the issues in ways which deny spaces for 
opposition.  
This relates to a more general neglect of questions of power and conflict in contemporary debates on 
CSR (Newell 2002: 98). Utting notes that government and corporate action on CSR ‘is not simply a technical 
issue of know-how, resource availability, “win-win” situations or even greater environmental awareness on the 
part of key decision makers’, rather it is a political process ‘involving power struggles between different actors 
and stakeholders’ (Utting 2002: 277). While often operating at the level of a technical and rational discourse of 
“win-win” that provides the business case for CSR, such claims have to be viewed as a political practice that 
reflects the historical moments and social structures in which they emerge. In this regard, current emphasis on 
the role of business in development promoted by the UN’s Global Compact, the World Bank’s Business 
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Partners for Development and repeated claims from donors that firms are central players in efforts to combat 
poverty can be understood as an attempt to reconcile the unique and heightened power of corporations in the 
contemporary global political economy with increasing demands for improved standards of social and 
environmental performance. Invoking the language of sustainable development, ecological modernisation and 
the “triple bottom line” helps to diffuse threats to the expansion of markets by suggesting that corporate 
power, concentrated through trade and investment agreements, is not a problem as long as it is exercised 
“responsibly” in a way which meets the needs of multiple stakeholders including the poor. 
Power is also central to debates about participation and citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship assumes 
channels of participation for representation and rights recognition. While, in theory, the state hosts the 
infrastructure and mechanisms for claiming rights and mediating conflict between different interests (Kabeer 
2002), problematically, for those seeking to extend citizenship to corporations, ‘there are few channels for 
making companies answerable for the decisions they make, despite the impact of their investment choices on 
peoples lives’ (Newell 2002: 94). Engagement with stakeholders is often on a selective basis, and the only 
constituency that is guaranteed a voice is shareholders. Yet participation is simultaneously both an important 
prerequisite of citizenship and a mechanism for achieving accountability, in-so-far as increased access to and 
inclusion within decision-making processes increases the direct representation of citizens in the decisions 
affecting their lives. Given this, we explore citizen participation in “invited” spaces of participation, as well as 
in spaces that are “claimed” and “demanded” through a range of protest strategies and instances where people 
make and shape their own spaces for engagement (Cornwall 2000).  
 
2.2 Factor-based framework 
By putting questions of power at the heart of our analysis, we have derived three sets of factors which 
influence the effectiveness of citizen strategies for corporate accountability that were found to be key in the 
cases studied. These include:  
 
(i) government-related factors (state-company relations, state-community relations, state vulnerability to 
international pressures, and access to information and legal frameworks) 
(ii) company-related factors (corporate power, corporate vulnerability and corporate approaches to citizen 
participation) 
(iii) community-related factors (community power, community employment, intra-community relations and 
community-NGO relations). 
 
To be an effective strategy for corporate accountability, there needs to be both change within powerful 
institutions, such as the state and corporations, to respond to calls for greater accountability and participation 
and also within affected communities, if they are to take advantage of opportunities for increased 
representation. The following analysis will therefore consider the extent to which different strategies promote 
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corporate responsiveness “from above”, and the extent to which changes “from below” facilitate greater 
representation of previously excluded citizens through increasing access and inclusion in decisions affecting their 
lives. It is not just change in company behaviour to accommodate citizens’ demands that is significant, but 
changes in structures of representation that may allow for the expression of future accountability demands. 
We locate our analysis of the relationship between companies and communities within a broader “web” of 
accountability relationships, which also involve states, NGOs and international institutions, often pulling in 
competing directions. CA to the poor may therefore be influenced by the degree to which community 
interests conflate or conflict with the interests of other stakeholders, and the relative abilities of different 
stakeholders to ensure that their interests are met. The following section analyses community-based strategies 
for corporate accountability drawn from 46 case studies according to these two criteria of “effectiveness” to 
demonstrate how government, company, and community-related factors influence the effectiveness of those 
strategies.  
 
3  State-related factors 
A number of state-related factors are key to the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA. 
Government policies and legal frameworks protect and promote the relative rights and responsibilities of 
companies and communities. Government willingness and ability to implement sanctions influences how 
these play out in practice. Much of the literature concerned with the emergence of CSR suggests that citizen 
strategies aimed at corporations are often a response to the ineffectiveness of the state at ensuring 
implementation of business regulation (World Bank 2000; Murphy and Bendell 1997). Our analysis also 
suggests that the state influences the effectiveness of community-based strategies themselves.  
State control of resources means that the state often determines the access of a corporation or 
community to the resources that accountability struggles are commonly fought over (Mittelman 1998). The 
states’ regulatory role and fiscal and financial policies of states afford them influence over the levels of 
“downward” accountability required of companies. In a basic sense, therefore, states can give both incentives 
and disincentives to CSR actions by establishing content and process requirements for companies that operate 
in their jurisdiction. Company laws can require disclosure of information on social and environmental 
performance to investors, as well as determine levels of protection for workers, and set acceptable standards 
of environmental pollution.  
Here we argue that five state-related factors are key to understanding the effectiveness of community-
based strategies for CA. These are (i) the nature of the state-corporation relationship; (ii) the nature of the 
state-community relationship; (iii) state vulnerability to pressures from different international groups; 
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(iv) information availability and transparency; and (v) the legal framework, its enforcement and accessibility. 
These factors are key to understanding why some strategies may be adopted by communities, or may be 
successful in some contexts and not in others.  
 
3.1 The state-corporation relationship 
States have the formal power to regulate corporate activities and to implement sanctions against non-
compliance. Pratt and Fintel (2002) also found that state fiscal and financial policies influenced CSR in 
practice (in Costa Rica and El Salvador). They argued that in this context, state policies undermined CSR 
through subsidising and endorsing the unsustainable use of natural resources, just as a lack of human and 
financial resources may also undermine the capacities of governments to actively promote or enforce CSR 
(Utting 2002: 268). Conversely, Hanks (2002) found that in the South African context, the threat of punitive 
state actions, the political independence of relevant state authorities, and the provision of high-quality 
information flows promoted greater CSR. Governments can therefore increase the accountability of 
corporations to communities through using formal mechanisms, enforcing the responsibilities of 
corporations, and protecting the rights of citizens. However, a number of factors may prevent them from 
doing so.  
In order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), governments may offer a range of benefits to 
business. These may undermine citizen concerns for “responsible” investment in their area. The economic 
crisis in Kenya, for example, allied the state with Tiomin Inc., a Canadian mining company which was seeking 
to acquire surface rights in order to establish strip mining for titanium in Kwale, southern Kenya. In order to 
attract investment, the Kenyan government offered substantial incentives to business, which limited the 
potential benefits accruing to the community (Ojiambo 2002: 8). In this way the government helped to 
generate opposition to the investment, as the campaign against the mine focused, not on opposing the mine 
per se, but seeking to ‘ensure responsible investment that does not lead to environmental degradation and that 
upholds community rights’ (Ojiambo 2002: 14) which campaigners felt was undermined by the agreement 
reached between Tiomin and the government. 
In some cases, state support to corporations depends less on this attempt to balance national 
“development” with local interests, but rather stems from the direct financial benefit accruing to government 
officials. The huge rents that Nigerian military governments have received over a number of decades from 
Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta, for example, have served to strengthen the government’s resolve to 
silence local activists campaigning against the environmental and social impacts of oil extraction (Okonta and 
Douglas 2001; Obiora 1999). In Siberut, Indonesia, links between local officials and logging companies 
allegedly led to the granting of many illegal logging permits for companies to undertake commercial logging in 
the protected biosphere reserve of Siberut Island, despite the opposition of local Mentawai communities 
(Down to Earth 2001; 2000). 
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The relationship between state and company officials may also undermine the enforcement of sanctions 
against corporations, and may impede citizen attempts to do so. Dependency upon a particular industry may 
mean the state is unwilling to jeopardise investment from that sector and the wider ramifications this may 
have in discouraging other investments. The dependence of Ecuador upon oil revenues for approximately 40 
to 50 per cent of export income led the government to oppose legal action by communities against the oil 
company, Texaco. The government presented a diplomatic protest to the US government in an attempt to 
stop the case against Texaco being held there, for fear of deterring potential investors in Ecuador, even after 
the company had left (Kimmerling 1996). 
Moreover, even where states are willing to enforce sanctions, they may be unable to implement sanctions 
against more powerful TNCs. In January 1999, the US-based Delta & Pine Land Company allegedly ignored a 
Paraguayan court order to remove 660 tons of cotton seeds that it had dumped in Riconí, a rural Paraguayan 
community. The seeds had been treated with toxic compounds, and adequate precautions were apparently not 
taken by the company in the handling of the materials; in the protection of the subsoil, or in the protection of 
community inhabitants. Medical testing found a number of cases of acute pesticide poisoning among 
residents, and in 1998, according to Greenpeace, one man died as a result of poisoning. The state, however, 
was unable to enforce a legal ruling against the company (Greenpeace 2002: 60).  
The close relationship that frequently exists between states and corporations is often a barrier to effective 
CA. Citizen access to the formal sanctions that states can use may be limited. In addition, poorer states may 
be unwilling or unable to enforce sanctions. Citizens may therefore employ informal sanctions directly against 
companies. In the above cases, these included direct action (such as impeding road-building), the sabotage of 
oil operations in Nigeria, and the burning of the base camp of one of the logging operations on the island of 
Siberut, Indonesia. Such sanctions have occasionally led to negotiations between companies and communities. 
For example, in Ecuador negotiations have secured corporate responsiveness in terms of providing 
community projects or infrastructure. However, these “successes” amount to philanthropy rather than 
accountability in practice, as citizens generally enter these negotiations without much bargaining leverage and, 
therefore, have to accept whatever the company is prepared to give, rather than being able to assert their 
rights (Kimmerling 1996).  
 
3.2 The state-community relationship 
The ability of communities to hold corporations to account is also affected by their relationship with the state. 
Following claims about toxic contamination of the surrounding environment by Rhodia SA (now Aventis 
Crop Sciences) in Brazil, citizen and worker groups sought to obtain an injunction from the Public Prosecutor 
to force the company to halt activities at their Cubatão facility. In the same year, the Public Prosecutor, 
company and workers negotiated a deal guaranteeing workers lifelong healthcare, and treatment of the ground 
water. In addition, in April 2002 a public hearing was held to discuss the company’s liability in the 
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contamination case. State attention can, therefore, increase the legitimacy and strength of citizen claims 
towards corporations. However, bad relations between the state and community can impede community-
based strategies for CA. 
State discrimination against particular sections of society manifests itself in actions such as racialised 
planning and the location of hazardous production sites in poorer communities. There is a large body of 
literature which describes this trend as “environmental racism” (Cole and Foster 2002; Pellow and Park 2002). 
In the Californian towns of Kettleman City and Buttonwillow, decisions have favoured the siting of 
incinerators and toxic waste facilities in areas with predominantly Latino residents, rather than in other, 
predominantly white towns in Kings County and Kern County (Cole and Foster 2002). Local communities 
felt ill-informed about proposed developments, and that they had been deliberately targeted for industrial 
development that other, wealthier, communities refused to accept. In such instances local authorities decide 
upon sites where residents are least likely to oppose such developments, which a 1984 report for the 
California Waste Management Board suggested would be ‘rural communities, poor communities, communities 
whose residents has low educational levels . . . and whose residents were employed in resource-extractive jobs’ 
(Cole and Foster 2002: 3). Thus, where communities are politically marginalised within state decision-making 
processes, they may be more vulnerable to environmentally damaging or unpopular corporate activities. 
A poor relationship between a community and a government may also manifest itself in the state’s refusal 
to recognise a community’s rights. In the case of Timika, West Papua, Indonesia, the state privileged the rights 
of corporations over those of the local Amungme and Kamoro communities. The mining enterprise Freeport 
McMoran (major holder Rio Tinto) was granted the de facto role of government as a result of the contract it 
signed with the Indonesian government in 1966. The contract gave Freeport broad powers over local 
communities and resources, including the right to take, on a tax-free basis, land, timber, water, and other 
natural resources, and to resettle indigenous inhabitants with compensation required only for dwellings and 
permanent improvements. Compensation was not required for the loss of hunting and fishing grounds, water 
supplies, or damage to livelihoods (Abrash 2001). Having undermined indigenous rights vis à vis Freeport, the 
state has also undermined community strategies to improve CA, for example by using force to prevent a 
lawyer meeting with local clients in 1996, preventing an indigenous activist from travelling to London to raise 
awareness at Rio Tinto’s AGM, and in the violent repression of demonstrations (Abrash 2001; Madeley 1999).  
These cases demonstrate that poor relations between the state and a community can reduce the 
responsiveness of corporations by undermining community rights. Community strategies therefore often aim 
to increase the profile of citizen rights. In the Kettleman City and Buttonwillow cases, legal challenges against 
the granting of permits to chemical waste companies were based upon the principle of discrimination against 
Spanish speakers in the decision-making process. Both resident communities protested about the lack of 
Spanish translation in public consultation meetings and documentation. In Kettleman City, this provided the 
basis of a successful legal challenge to the proposed development (Cole and Foster 2002). On the other hand, 
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active repression of community-rights in the Indonesian case has left few channels open to community 
mobilisation. The Amungme and Kamoro communities successfully attracted international attention through 
publicising their experiences, which led the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (a government 
agency that provides political risk insurance to US businesses overseas) to cancel their US$100 million policy 
for Freeport in 1996. However, despite this, there has been a lack of state or company responsiveness to 
community demands (Abrash 2001). 
 
3.3 State vulnerability to international pressure 
International legal commitments and obligations to multilateral economic actors can also shape the position a 
state adopts regarding a conflict between a company and a community. State vulnerability to different types of 
pressure may arise as a result of a concern for its international reputation, for example over issues such as 
human rights or the environment (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Equally, dependence upon loans from institutions, 
such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose loan conditionalities may favour 
particular policies, potentially affects the stance of a government regarding company-community conflicts. 
While most democratic states may be vulnerable to the first of these, poorer countries are more vulnerable to 
the types of pressures exerted by the latter. 
International pressure upon states can serve to decrease the responsiveness of corporations to local 
communities. In Colombia, the U’wa campaign against Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) achieved 
some progress in getting government recognition of traditional land rights. However, these gains are 
potentially undermined by IMF pressure on the Colombian government. The IMF stipulates that Colombia 
should speed up oil production, thereby pulling in the opposite direction to local U’wa concerns, and 
potentially undermining their ability to maintain their land rights in the face of illegal test drilling by oil 
companies (Izquierdo 2001). Similarly, in Sri Lanka, IMF loan conditionalities mandating changes in workers 
rights, including the replacement of tripartite wage boards with productivity councils and introducing a 14-day 
notice of strike, threaten to further undermine the campaign by free trade zone (FTZ) workers in Sri Lanka to 
get state and business recognition of their rights to organise and to collective bargaining (Marcus and Dent 
2001).  
International pressure is most likely to determine “effectiveness” through heightening the responsiveness 
of governments and corporations to community-based strategies for CA. Strategies that seek to influence the 
pressures exerted by multilateral agencies such as the IMF, rely upon tapping into international networks and 
alliances that have more leverage than local communities acting alone. However, the importance of local-level 
organisation should not be underestimated – the U’wa and Sri Lankan FTZ workers have mobilised 
themselves to achieve the limited successes that they have enjoyed on the ground. Where there is a lack of 
international pressure supportive of the plight of local communities, citizens have resorted to direct actions, 
such as demonstrations, road-blocks and sit-ins to draw attention to their case. 
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3.4 Information availability and transparency 
States have a range of instruments they can use to demand greater transparency and openness from 
corporations that can increase their answerability, including rules regarding corporate disclosure of 
information, and citizens’ rights to information. However, the level of state commitment to making data 
available, and the access of poorer and more marginalised groups to such mechanisms may be limited, with 
implications for the effectiveness of different strategies for holding corporations to account. 
Firstly, without mechanisms making the provision of information compulsory and routine, for example 
regarding industrial chemical use, people may unknowingly “work, live and play” in hazardous conditions, to 
coin a phrase from the environmental justice movement. Without such information people may not realise 
that their rights have been violated until harm has already been done. For example, the US government was 
said to be actively complicit with uranium mining companies in keeping information regarding the significant 
health-risks posed by uranium mining hidden from workers in uranium mines in Utah and Arizona from the 
1940s to the 1960s. The deliberate suppression of this information prevented the workers from seeking 
environmental justice from the mining companies which were not implementing safe ventilation procedures, 
which might have prevented the lung cancer many workers subsequently developed. Limited compensation 
for damages has only been granted in the 1990s following decades of campaigning by Navajo community 
groups (Brugge et al. 2001). Similarly, Cape plc, a UK-owned mining company, was accused of failing to 
protect asbestos miners in South Africa, despite being aware of the link between asbestos and fatal lung 
diseases. During the 1960s the company tried to bury reports detailing the link (ACTSA 2001). In this case 
people had to resort to ex poste accountability, because lack of information prevented them from campaigning 
earlier for safer working conditions, or from choosing to leave the mine. 
Secondly, without mechanisms for ensuring demands for information are met, “proof” of misconduct, 
and therefore enforcing a response from a corporation, is not possible. According to Greenpeace, 
approximately one thousand workers, and an unknown number of villagers were exposed to mercury as a 
result of toxic vapour and effluent emissions from the Unilever mercury thermometer production plant in 
Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India. However, the company is alleged to have refused to give ex-workers their 
health records and to have opposed any independent health or environmental survey. Without such 
information, the community has been unable to seek remediation for the health and environmental damage 
caused by mercury pollution in their area (Greenpeace 2002: 49–50).  
Thirdly, a lack of transparency about the decision-making process and who is responsible for what can 
undermine attempts by communities to influence decisions. In Siberut, Indonesia, the Tiop community was 
not given answers to its questions regarding which authorities were responsible for monitoring company 
activities or withdrawing permits, and why logging permits had been issued at all on the UNESCO designated  
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‘Man and Biosphere’ reserve. This lack of transparency has facilitated the granting of illegal permits to outside 
companies posing as local Mentawaian small-scale cooperatives on the Siberut Island (Down to Earth 2000; 
2001).  
As the US and South African cases above demonstrated, where the state has not made ex-ante 
mechanisms available, litigation can be employed to get ex-poste accountability. However, given the severity of 
human loss alleged in these cases, litigation is clearly a second best option compared to full information 
disclosure about an industry’s operations at the outset. Where citizens suspect misconduct, but the company 
refuses to disclose information, alternative documentation strategies have been adopted. Citizen epidemiology, 
NGO-led “diagnostic camps” and citizen pollution sampling have been used by groups in India to defend 
themselves against company claims that their allegations of air and water pollution are exaggerated (Newell 
2003a and b).  
 
3.5 The legal framework, access and enforceability  
One of the primary mechanisms of accountability used by the state to govern corporations is the law, which 
may be understood as a political mechanism for defining rights and allocating responsibilities (Ward 2003). It 
can create an enabling environment for accountability by governing access to key resources, determining 
economic entitlements and shaping the rules of participation in public life (Newell and Bellour 2002: 8). 
However, legal frameworks do not provide a “neutral” space and may favour some to the exclusion of others. 
In the corporate arena, the legal framework can determine for example, the level of legal requirements 
regarding corporate disclosure, the level of public consultation required for proposed developments, and the 
level of recognition accorded to the entitlements of different groups – for example concerning communal 
land rights. Key factors influencing the effectiveness of strategies for CA therefore include the way the legal 
framework is enforced, if at all, and how accessible it is for poorer and marginalised groups.  
Native American communities in Wisconsin, USA, successfully used legal treaties and their sovereign 
status to oppose Exxon and Rio Algom’s proposed development of a zinc and copper mine near their 
reserves. They benefited from Federal Government support for the development of a tribal water regulatory 
authority, giving them the power to regulate proposed developments affecting their environment. The 
existence of sovereign rights for tribal peoples provided an essential legal framework for ensuring downward 
CA. However, federal-level commitment to these regulations was essential, as the Wisconsin state-level 
government, which supported the proposed development, challenged and opposed these laws (Grossman and 
Gedicks 2001). Such high level support is not always there to ensure the law works as a mechanism of 
downward accountability. 
Where older laws are in place, often written to serve colonial administrations, the state may employ them 
to override more progressive legislation. For example, in Cameroon the legacy of French colonial rule has 
facilitated the destruction of traditional property regimes as provisions regarding “state property” could be 
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invoked to grant the state considerable privilege to expropriate forest land. Present governments have 
continued this policy of confiscating commons for profit-making purposes, despite the opposition of 
traditional forest-dwellers such as the Bantu and Baka people of the Djoum and Campo regions of southern 
Cameroon (Nguiffo 1998: 108). Similarly, the colonial legacy of legal instruments such as the Mining Act in 
Kenya, facilitated the compulsory appropriation of indigenous lands by the government without adequate 
protection of customary land ownership. This happened despite the existence of newer, more progressive 
legislation such as the Environmental Management and Coordination Act 1999 (EMCA), due to a lack of 
commitment by the government to fully implement the EMCA (Ojiambo 2002: 17). Newell (2003b) also 
shows how the colonial Land Acquisition Act has been used in India to remove people from lands required 
for private industrial projects deemed to be in the national interest, resulting in displacement and loss of 
livelihoods from some of the poorest groups.  
Along with non-implementation, states can also actively undermine legal provisions that may help 
citizens make corporations more accountable. The growth of unregulated economic production sites in the 
global economy that go by names such as export processing zones (EPZs), new economic zones or free trade 
zones, have exacerbated this process. Since 1999, workers in Sri Lanka have had the legal right to create a 
union and bargain collectively. However, FTZ workers have been unable to receive legal recognition for ten 
out of the eleven branches of the FTZ Workers Union (FTZWU). The Sri Lankan state and businesses 
operating in the FTZs have joined forces to oppose, repress and disband the FTZWU. The “virtual 
breakdown” in the judicial system as a result of the prolonged war means that there is no formal enforcement 
of these rights (Marcus and Dent 2001). 
Litigation is often employed with the aim of enforcing legal rights or responsibilities where they exist. In 
the case of Kettleman City, despite local government support for granting the permit to the company, the fact 
that procedural legal requirements had not been met allowed citizens to use litigation to prevent the permit 
being granted. However, the effectiveness of such strategies varies and the enforcement of rights and 
responsibilities remains one of the biggest challenges for poorer groups. Cost and high legal literacy 
requirements often exclude poorer citizens from accessing legal redress. In addition, the types of outcome that 
litigation can generate are in many ways limited. Redress may be limited to a financial payout and not address 
livelihood alternatives that have been diminished by an industry’s activities. This was the case with the Ok 
Tedi mining project in Papua New Guinea where compensation packages were unable to replace traditional 
livelihood options such as fishing that, it was claimed, had been irreversibly damaged by the activities of the 
mining company Broken Hill Proprietary Corporation Ltd (BHP) (Kirsch 1996b). Similarly, Haifa Chemicals 
Ltd, a US company operating in Israel, was accused of releasing toxic chemicals into the Kishon River since 
1966. Lawsuits brought against the company succeeded in achieving limited compensation for boat owners, 
but, it is claimed have not dealt with other important issues including health effects, loss of income, or the 
cleanup of the river (Greenpeace 2002: 32). Even where litigation is unsuccessful in achieving legal outcomes,  
 15 
Table 3.1 Summary of the influence of state-related factors on effectiveness 
Factor Influences:  Strategies 
 Responsiveness Representation  
State weakness 
relative to TNC  
 
 
 
State unable to enforce 
sanctions  
 
State unwilling to 
enforce sanctions 
Undermining of 
community rights to 
consultation, and to 
land, social and 
environmental rights  
Direct action 
Sabotage 
Publicity campaigns 
Legal action 
Corrupt links 
between state 
officials and TNCs 
State officials may 
benefit from rents from 
TNCs and therefore 
protect companies from 
community demands 
A lack of transparency 
around decision-making 
excludes citizens from 
engaging in dialogue 
with powerholders 
 
Nature of 
relationship 
between state and 
community  
Protection of 
community rights 
 
Non-recognition of 
rights of particular 
communities (e.g. 
indigenous land rights)  
State decision-making 
is biased against 
poorer, more socially 
excluded communities  
Publicity 
Legal challenges 
Direct action 
International 
pressure on the 
state 
Concern with 
international reputation 
 
Dependence on donors/ 
vulnerability to 
international NGO 
campaigns 
 
Dependence on donors 
 Alliances with 
international NGOs 
Lack of state 
commitment to 
compulsory 
provision of 
information  
Non-provision and 
refusal to release 
information, and 
misinformation 
undermine ex-ante and 
ex-poste accountability  
 
 
 Ex-poste strategies 
include litigation 
against deliberate 
non-disclosure or 
misinformation  
 
Ex-ante campaigns 
and protests to 
demand information 
 
Citizen epidemiology 
or pollution sampling  
State 
implementation of 
legal rights and 
responsibilities 
Legitimises citizen 
campaigns (e.g. land 
rights, self-
determination) 
 
Non-implementation of 
rights of communities 
Lack of commitment to 
implementing rights to 
participate (e.g. in EIA) 
Use of legal forum 
(e.g. tribal water 
authority) 
 
Campaign to establish 
legal rights/ 
recognition 
 
Litigation 
 
Note: In columns two and three, normal text refers to decreasing effectiveness; text in italics refers to increasing 
effectiveness. 
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it may nevertheless be an important part of a wider strategy through conferring recognition of rights violations 
that may otherwise not be acknowledged, raising awareness, and attracting wider public support for an 
accountability struggle (Newell 2001b). In the example cited above, while the EMCA in Kenya was not 
implemented, its existence was nevertheless valuable, as it gave focus and legitimacy to the campaign to ensure 
that Tiomin undertook a “responsible” investment.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
State-related factors undermining the responsiveness of companies to community demands include the 
protection of corporations from sanctions by undermining community rights, protecting corporations from 
disclosing details of their operations and discretionary choices not to create or not to implement progressive 
legal frameworks. Strategies adopted by communities to counter this privileging of corporate entitlements 
over community rights have ranged from engaging in formal legal processes, such as litigation, to international 
alliance-building, negotiations with corporations and direct actions. These factors and strategies are 
summarised Table 3.1. 
The effectiveness of these strategies has depended upon the extent to which (i) the state has backed the 
corporation or the community; (ii) international pressures have benefited corporations or communities; (iii) 
communities have access to information; and (iv) the state has been willing to implement progressive or 
oppressive elements within existing legal frameworks. These factors clearly work in conjunction with each 
other and in different combinations as the cases cited in this section illustrate. 
 
4  Company-related factors 
There are a number of company-related factors that influence the effectiveness of community-based strategies 
for CA. Many of these relate to the degree of latitude a company has to respond to demands made of it at a 
particular point in time. Zadek (2001: 129) suggests that this freedom is defined by general factors such as 
technological opportunities, competitor strategies and public pressure as well as company-specific factors such 
as availability of finance, quality of leadership and overall corporate competencies. At issue also are the 
perceived boundaries of a company’s responsibility to involve communities in its decision-making. With 
regard to corporate-community relations, some of the traditional mechanisms of accountability and 
participation associated with the state are not applicable – as corporations clearly do not have the same 
“democratic duty”, or means of dealing with conflicting rights-based claims (Newell 2002). Their traditional 
purpose has been the generation of profit, and this overriding objective remains despite rhetoric about 
meeting the “triple-bottom line” (Elkington 1998).  
Corporate power, including capital mobility, control of resources and the ability to co-opt state support, 
influences how companies respond to community-based strategies (Newell 2002). Often communities’ 
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dependence on a company for employment, particularly in areas of high unemployment and where the 
company is able to move its operations elsewhere, serves to silence criticism or the articulation of 
accountability demands. This dynamic is described in the community power debates in the USA in the 1960s 
(Crenson 1971). The relative power of corporations compared to the communities and countries in which 
they invest means that community-based strategies can often be ‘accommodated and deflated through partial 
responses, co-option or so-called “institutional capture”, which enables business interests to exert 
considerable influence over the decision-making processes of standard-setting and regulatory institutions’ 
(Utting 2002: 288). The power of companies in many such settings is also reinforced by the pressure of 
international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF to open their markets to foreign investors. The 
value of their presence is lent further weight by discourses that deliberately collapse differences that may exist 
between what is in the national interest and the interest of a firm through reference to a firm’s contribution to 
development and economic growth. 
We argue here that three company-related factors are important in determining the effectiveness of 
citizen strategies for CA: (i) the levels at which corporate power operates; (ii) the vulnerability of different 
types of corporation to particular strategies; and (iii) a corporation’s approach to citizen participation. 
 
4.1 Corporate power  
 
Financial: Corporate financial power can limit a company’s responsiveness through countering a number of 
sanctions communities may take against them. Companies can hire security protection to secure investment 
sites from protest activities as in the cases of Shell in Nigeria, Freeport in Indonesia, and Oxy in Colombia. 
They can invest large sums of money in public relations campaigns to defend themselves against negative 
publicity, fund scientific studies countering claims made against them, and ensure that the company has “the 
best” legal advice when faced with litigation. They can engage in long-term legal battles, where communities 
may run out of funds. In addition, legal cases can be initiated against communities to deter their campaigns. In 
Buttonwillow, Kern County, USA, the company Laidlaw and county-level authorities sued the Buttonwillow 
residents for legal expenses, after the community had already lost a legal challenge against the expansion of the 
Laidlaw toxic waste dump situated near their town (Cole and Foster 2002). In a similar “strategic sanction 
against public participation”, Cambior, the major shareholder in Omai Gold Mine Ltd., Guyana, brought a 
case against a campaigner for shareholder activism. In many cases, the sanctions that citizens are able to 
mobilise against corporations can be outdone due to the resources corporations can draw upon. In so far as 
activists anticipate such countervailing action by the company, there may be a deterrence effect for those 
considering future campaigns. 
 
Employment, dependency and politics of silence: The power conferred by being a major employer can also make 
employees within a local community self-censor demands for accountability from a corporation. In Oak 
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Ridge, Tennessee, USA, government and industrial contractors involved in nuclear bomb manufacturing 
allegedly used threats of dismissal to prevent their own, highly qualified workers from investigating the extent 
of mercury contamination caused by the company in the local creek. Through restricting information, the 
company prevented local residents from demanding accountability (Merrifield 1993). The power conferred by 
generating employment is also used as a bargaining resource by companies who pit the need of communities 
for employment against their demands for improved levels of social and environmental protection. In Kenya, 
when campaigners sought to engage Tiomin in a dialogue on issues, including adequate compensation for 
people with customary land titles, and environmental protection measures, Tiomin allegedly responded with 
threats to pull out of the area altogether (Ojiambo 2002: 33).  
 
Mobility: Capital mobility and the possibility of relocation provide many companies with significant leverage 
over less-mobile labour. This structural power can also contribute to the silencing and self-censorship of 
accountability demands. Threats to relocate in the face of community mobilisation are lent credibility by the 
actions of companies that have used community activism as an excuse to relocate their operations. For 
example, Mitsubishi was able to evade international demands for more “responsible” behaviour in its 
Malaysian plant by shutting this plant down and reopening in China (Karliner 1997). The US-based Allied 
Signal Seat Belt Company used mobility to its advantage as it transferred its operations between communities 
in the American South and Mexico. According to Gaventa, the company used the threat and reality of plant 
closings and layoffs ‘as a tool for “economic blackmail” and bargaining for labour concessions’ (Gaventa 
1990).  
Transnational patterns of production, increases in outsourcing and resulting complexity in global supply 
chains allow corporations to evade their responsibilities by claiming that their subsidiaries are separate legal 
entities. This formed the basis of corporate defence in a number of negligence cases, including those involving 
Union Carbide (UCC), Thor Chemicals and Cape plc. Companies are protected by the corporate “veil” which 
makes it difficult to establish the exact nature of the relationship between subsidiaries and large TNCs, 
particularly as the onus is often on the injured party to provide evidence of a clear chain-of-command 
between the home and host country (Newell 2001b). 
 
Knowledge and discourse: The use of expert knowledge to deny accountability claims is another tool which 
companies use to resist communities’ demands. Resort to official science and technocratic knowledge forms 
often disempowers poorer groups with lower levels of education, access to information and reduced ability to 
engage with the terms of the debate. Cast in such narrow terms where high and costly standards of 
verification are required, it becomes difficult for under-resourced communities to bear the burden of proof 
required to make a “scientific” case against a corporation on grounds of negligence. Even within spaces that 
are claimed to be more participatory, it remains difficult for people to bring their knowledge into deliberations 
that are framed in highly technical terms where experience-based knowledge is undervalued. Mulligan shows 
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how despite claiming to pioneer a participatory approach to dealing with questions of social responsibility in 
the development of a titanium mine in Madagascar, Rio Tinto continually referred to experts and “expert” 
knowledge in order to claim an intellectual monopoly over debates concerning the project, effectively 
excluding groups unable to participate in the debate on these terms (Mulligan 1999: 55).  
 
Companies may also take advantage of the uncertainty inherent in environmental or epidemiological studies, 
which make it difficult for communities to “prove” their claims against corporations. Rhodia SA (now 
Aventis) in Paulinha, Brazil, contested a number of studies that had found that the company’s use of 
inadequate technology for disposal of chemical wastes had caused pollution of the local environment and 
contaminated food-sources. Testimonies by workers regarding impacts to their health, and research by local 
scientists and an international environmental NGO (ENGO) were dismissed by Rhodia, who maintained that 
the levels of pollutants did not pose a risk (Greenpeace 2002: 38). There is a tension between determining 
socially-acceptable levels of risk, that should be a public-political exercise, and allowing a narrow range of 
experts, often either drawn directly from the commercial world or whose research work is funded by 
corporations to determine what is safe, what is acceptable, and for whom.  
Another important aspect of the politics of knowledge concerns the strategic employment by 
corporations of discourses about economic growth and development, and their assumed role in those 
processes which, through repetition and strong backing, acquire the status of common sense assumptions, 
rendering attempts to question them deviant and radical. As de facto custodians of the societal interest, it 
becomes easier for corporations to caricature opposition to new industrial projects as parochial and anti-
patriotic. This strategy is often reinforced by broader framings of indigenous communities and the livelihoods 
which sustain them, as “backward”, “undeveloped”, and “unproductive”. The incentives given to large 
livestock-raising and timber companies in the Brazilian Amazon for instance, reflected the view that latex 
extraction and nut harvesting by traditional populations were “backward” economic activities, and failed to 
utilise the area sufficiently (Diegus 1998: 58). As harbingers of “modernisation” and “development”, 
corporations are regarded as benefiting local communities, the economy and society as a whole, and the 
negative aspects of such developments are seen as unfortunate but necessary trade-offs. Such attitudes are 
expressed, for example, in the refusal of Golden Star Resources, the holder of 30 per cent of the Omai Gold 
Mine, Guyana, to compensate local residents for the effects of a major cyanide spill on drinking water, 
livestock and wildlife. The company claimed that such accidents ‘are one of the many risks of doing business’ 
(Greenpeace 2002: 92). 
The various dimensions and levels of corporate power therefore influence the effectiveness of 
community-based strategies in a multitude of ways. On the whole they serve to protect the corporation from 
the need to respond to community demands, and to reduce the effectiveness of community representation. 
Some of the most effective community-based strategies, however, draw upon international networks and 
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alliances to exert leverage over corporations, ensuring that they do not escape their responsibilities merely by 
relocating or threatening to relocate overseas. Following the announcement by the clothes manufacturer Gap 
of the closure of one of its factories in El Salvador as a response to campaigns against working conditions, 
campaigning by an international network of unions and religious groups influenced the company to stay in El 
Salvador, pressure its contractors to respect basic workers rights and allow independent monitoring of a Gap 
Code of Conduct (Cavanagh and Broad 1996: 22). NGOs and community groups, through information 
exchange and coalition-building, have also been able to demonstrate the links between subsidiaries and TNC 
headquarters where companies claim they are separate entities in order to evade responsibility. In the case 
against the UK-based Cape plc the parent company was found to be liable for knowingly subjecting workers 
in its asbestos mine in South Africa to hazardous working conditions (ACTSA 2002). At the local level, 
citizens mobilise constituencies for change, counter dominant knowledges and discourses through awareness-
raising, campaigning, systemising local knowledge, and through direct actions. Much of the effectiveness of 
these strategies depends upon the vulnerability of particular sectors and companies to different strategies. 
 
4.2 Vulnerability to citizen sanctions 
The following cases support the finding that TNCs, as a result of their vulnerability to international scrutiny, 
may be more likely to respond to community-based strategies than national corporations. National companies 
in developing countries may be protected to some degree from sanctions if they have close ties to the national 
government. In the Czech Republic, Spolana’s monopoly of PVC production and personal links to the 
government undermined the responsiveness to community demands for compensation following the alleged 
damage to workers’ health arising from the production of Agent Orange in the 1960s (Greenpeace 2002: 44). 
In India, government ownership of the Plantation Corporation of Kerala (PCK) has impeded citizen attempts 
to hold the company accountable for causing pollution related illness among the local population over a 20-
year period. (Joshi 2001). Similarly, the Government of India’s commitment to the flagship company NTPC 
(National Thermal Power Corporation) helps to explain its lack of intervention in conflicts with local 
communities over claims of livelihood destruction and environmental contamination in Andhra Pradesh 
(Newell 2003b). 
While TNCs are often more powerful in global terms than national corporations, this status can also 
increase their vulnerability to the types of pressures and strategies that citizens can tap into. Pratt and Fintel 
(2002) found that leading firms in Costa Rica, producing for the export market were more likely to have 
improved some aspect of their environmental policy than those producing for the domestic market. Similarly, 
they noted a “parent company effect”, whereby firms owned largely by international capital, had more 
environmental policies, plans and procedures than domestic firms. This effect is related to pressures on firms 
lower down commodity chains to adopt higher standards in order to export to international markets. This is 
consistent with Vogel’s argument about “trading up”; that the desire of exporters to access key markets in 
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Europe and North America, for example, serves to drive standards up as these regions require higher levels of 
social and environmental performance (Vogel 1997). Location within the supply chain also influences the 
vulnerability of corporations to international public opinion, where consumer opinion in Northern markets in 
particular has been found to be an important factor in shaping responsiveness of companies to community-
based campaigns (Bendell 2000; Murphy and Bendell 2002; Newell 2002, 2000).  
Where their shareholder base is more diversified and their operations are based in countries with strong 
NGOs working on development issues, companies are more likely to find their global operations subject to 
scrutiny. The extent to which firms are based in countries with strong traditions of corporate governance can 
also be important. Zadek notes (2001: 30), the ‘emerging, dominant forms of global corporate citizenship are 
. . . deeply influenced by Anglo-American (US or UK) practice.’ Greenpeace claims that Shell Brazil SA 
responded to demands for it to buy ranches from local people, whose land had allegedly been contaminated 
by the company, not as a result of pressure from the local authorities and community, but due to its 
vulnerability to negative international publicity, including the possibility of a critical report about Shell Brazil 
to the “FTSE4good” ethical investment index (Greenpeace 2002: 41). Having operations in different parts of 
the world makes TNCs vulnerable to exposure to claims of double standards. Following the discovery of large 
concentrations of highly toxic mercury in a river near Durban, an alliance of trade unions, peasant groups and 
green groups from a number of different countries mounted demonstrations against the company Thor 
Chemicals whom they accused of practising double standards. Mittelman concludes (1998: 865) ‘this joint 
action within civil society put pressure on the Department of Water Affairs, which ordered Thor chemicals to 
suspend its operations.’  
However, many TNCs are not vulnerable to these forms of international and consumer pressure. While 
Tiomin Resources Inc. was considered a “giant” in Kenya, with potential to bring in much needed FDI, the 
Canadian government’s Mines and Geology Department told campaigners against the mine that ‘Tiomin and 
titanium does not exist on our radar’ (Ojiambo 2002: 26). This example is interesting in that mining 
companies have been at the forefront of initiatives to improve their image given the controversy that their 
operations have generated in the past (Evans et al. 2002). It suggests that while there is some evidence of a link 
between the scale of a company’s social and environmental impact and its likelihood of engaging in CSR 
initiatives, (a) this is not always the case as service sectors that have been less prominent in these debates also 
generate a considerable social and environmental impact (Pellow and Park 2002); and (b) national cultural 
factors and social expectations bear heavily on a company’s responsiveness, often more so than international 
calls for improved practice.  
Improving responsiveness nevertheless means exploiting areas of a company’s vulnerability. Campaigns 
often target shareholders and financial backers who may exert greater leverage over corporations than 
communities themselves. Campaigners can, for example, buy shares and attend AGMs, or lobby shareholders 
in AGMs (Marinetto 1998). However, this proactivity on the part of activists is tempered by the willingness of 
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shareholders to back their demands and use their influence to advance them. Ultimately, in appealing to 
shareholders, activist’s claims must compete with their concerns for profit maximisation. Shareholder activism 
is thus one of the more obvious areas in which “webs” of accountability may pull in competing directions. 
Campaigns likely to be most successful are those targeted against areas of negligible value to the overall 
operations of the company, playing on the “hassle factor” so that the potential for reduced profits and 
damaged reputation in other, more important, markets makes the targeted operation a liability (Rodman 
1998).  
 
4.3 Corporate approaches to citizen participation 
The literature on participation and accountability highlights the importance of a range of factors to the 
effectiveness of institutional accountability to citizens. Particular groups may be excluded from partnership or 
consultative initiatives either through non-recognition of key issues such as land rights, for example, or by the 
self-exclusion of more vulnerable groups. The framing of spaces for citizen participation determines the issues 
or problems which will be considered. The danger, where spaces are tightly controlled or the agenda framed 
narrowly, is that people can legitimise a participatory process without influencing it. Whose knowledge takes 
precedence, and the power this implies, also affects how citizens can engage in participatory spaces. The 
attitude of corporations regarding the importance of community relations to the long-term viability of a 
project, and their reasons for creating spaces for participation emerge as important factors determining the 
effectiveness of demanded and invited participation. The stance of corporations on these issues ranges from a 
position of non-engagement, to reactive responses to demanded spaces, through to more explicit 
commitments to formal “invited” spaces for community participation in policy.  
In many of the case studies, companies showed little or no willingness to negotiate with the communities 
affected by their investments. PT Inco in Indonesia for example has shown an indifferent attitude to citizen 
participation. In 1994 when Inco announced the construction of two new hydro plants at Soroako, there was 
no public review process, no published environmental or social impact assessment, and no consultation 
between the company and local people. PT Inco also demonstrated that community relations were not a 
priority when it cancelled a meeting with residents of Soroako campaigning for the company to honour 
agreements that it had made regarding compensation for lands taken in 1973 (Moody 1999).  
In other cases, companies have taken a more proactive approach and engaged in community negotiations 
from the outset of their investment. This is often a response by a corporation to previous negative publicity 
regarding its activities. In the development of a proposed mine in Evatra, Madagascar, the UK-based mining 
company Rio Tinto engaged in a multi-pronged approach to improve its damaged reputation as a responsible 
investor, conducting a thorough environmental impact assessment (EIA) and social report (involving a public 
consultation), setting up a biodiversity research station, and making much of the research material available in 
the public domain (Mulligan 1999: 53). While explicit engagement in such activities is a step forward in 
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acknowledging accountability to local people, there were a number of drawbacks in the company’s approach 
to participation. One major issue was the non-recognition of communal or traditional land rights, thus 
excluding from negotiations a large proportion of the people who would be affected by the mine. Secondly, 
the company maintained tight control over the process, preventing the discussion of broader issues including 
whether or not there should be a mine (Mulligan 1999: 54–5).  
In 1999, Placer Dome, owning 90 per cent share in the Las Cristinas Gold Mining Company (MINCA), 
suspended its plans to develop a mine in Las Cristinas, Venezuela. The company took measures to prevent the 
situation becoming “socially unstable”, among those who had been evicted from the site, and were left 
unemployed by the actions of the company (Business Partners for Development 2001). These included the 
initiation of a “tri-sector partnership” facilitated by Business Partners for Development (BPD). However, the 
type of partnership that they embarked on, while using the language of partnership and ownership, was 
regarded as instrumental because the partnership was restricted to the development of a health centre instead 
of engaging local people in addressing the issues raised by the suspension of mine development. As BDP 
describes it: 
 
what the tri-sector partnering provides is a systematic management tool for companies to translate social 
policies developed at the corporate level into action at the operational project level [emphasis added]. 
(Warner 2002: 49) 
 
This type of partnership fits more with “projects with people” (Cornwall 2000), than with an approach that 
seeks to engage people in decision-making that affects them. Our analysis of BPD (2001a) suggests that much 
of the impetus for engaging partners in the “social policy” was for the cost sharing element, with communities 
supplying voluntary labour and overseeing the continued running of the facility once the company had 
withdrawn. The company, by comparison, made no long-term commitment to the project (Business Partners 
for Development 2001). It is perhaps telling that while BDP outlines the risks to various partners, including 
the risk of business credibility should the project fail and of the political risk to governments, there is no 
mention of the risks communities face in legitimising such partnerships, such as contributing their labour 
without having had a real voice in their design. 
An obvious and key factor determining the effectiveness of community participation in demanded and 
“invited” spaces has therefore been the extent to which and ways in which the corporation chooses to engage 
with citizens. Demanded spaces often mean that corporations engage in a reactive manner, and seem more 
concerned with “damage limitation”, rather than acknowledging the right of citizens to participate in decisions 
affecting their lives. However, the relative level of citizen organisation and nature of the strategies adopted are 
also important to how corporations view demanded spaces. For instance, the Innu and Innuit opponents of 
proposed mining at Voisey’s Bay, Canada were well organised, had previous experience of campaigning 
against low-level flying, and were also in negotiations with the state regarding the legalisation of indigenous 
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land rights. Strategies included successfully negotiating with the company who discovered the mineral 
resources, Diamond Field Resources (DFR) (Innes 2001). DFR responded by sending the company president 
to meet Innu representatives. Further, Innu leaders have employed powerful narratives of cultural survival and 
environmental justice within the negotiations to express their rights. These strategies appear to have been 
effective in achieving Innu and Innuit representation, even after the sale of the rights to Inco. Achievements 
in this regard included a single panel review committee judging the permitting process, and a public hearing 
on all aspects of the project. In addition, Inco announced intentions to incorporate “traditional ecological 
knowledge” in the project (Moody 1999). The response of Inco to community organisation in Voisey’s Bay 
compares starkly to its alleged lack of commitment to community relations in Soroako, Indonesia (Moody 
1999), although state-related factors are also significant in this instance.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
Company-related factors influencing responsiveness include the many different levels at which corporate 
power operates which enable corporations to outmanoeuvre citizen strategies, and that privilege company 
perspectives over the alternative perspectives of affected communities; the level of vulnerability of companies 
to internationalised or local citizen strategies; and corporate approaches to citizen participation. The latter also 
has particular relevance for the level of representation of communities through the ways that it influences the 
inclusion and exclusion of particular groups, the control and framing of invited spaces, and the types of 
knowledge that are considered legitimate within such spaces. Strategies by communities to achieve CA have 
included the formation of international networks, shareholder activism, local-level mobilisation, capacity-
building, and direct action. These factors and strategies are summarised in Table 4.1. 
The effectiveness of these strategies has depended upon the extent to which: (i) the leverage community 
and NGO strategies exert coincides with corporate vulnerabilities to particular types of strategies, and the 
ability of groups to take advantage of “openings” that are created, and (ii) the relative level of civil society 
organisation and capacity to demand and take advantage of both demanded and invited spaces of 
participation. While the latter potentially increases the representation of communities in decision-making, 
successful “engagement” in the process does not necessarily translate into changes in practice. This depends 
upon the sanctions that communities and their allies can employ to enforce action. In addition to the role of 
state-related factors in these processes, we have also noted a number of community-related factors that 
fundamentally influence effectiveness. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of the influence of company-related factors on effectiveness 
Factor Influences:  Strategies 
 Corporate 
responsiveness 
Community 
representation 
 
Corporate power 
operating at 
different levels 
Financial power of 
protects company 
from strategies 
 
Financial power 
enables companies 
to act positively 
 
Monopoly of 
knowledge  
International 
networks and 
alliances 
 
Global coalitions 
 
Awareness-raising  
 
 Employer status 
discourages 
community 
opposition boosts 
companies 
negotiating power 
 
Legitimising 
discourses 
Information 
exchange 
 
Promotion of local 
knowledge 
 
Direct action 
Corporate 
vulnerability to 
citizen strategies 
Protection of national 
firm 
 
 Shareholder/financie
r activism 
 Transnationality 
 
 International 
publicity 
 Unwillingness to 
negotiate with 
community 
Unwillingness to 
negotiate with 
community 
 
Direct action 
Corporate 
approach to 
citizen 
participation 
Tight control and 
limited framing of 
spaces 
 
Reactive stance to 
demanded spaces 
 
Instrumentalist 
approach to 
participation 
Exclusive stance to 
participation 
Negotiating with 
companies 
 
Strategic use of 
discourses 
 
Local citizen 
mobilisation and 
organisation 
 
Note: In columns two and three, normal text refers to decreasing effectiveness; text in italics refers to increased 
effectiveness. 
 
5  Community-related factors 
The literature on power, accountability and participation makes clear that enforcing sanctions for downward 
accountability, and engaging effectively in spaces of participation, is affected not only by changes from 
“above” but also from “below”. While a lack of financial resources, political marginalisation from decision-
making processes, and dependence upon industries clearly inhibit communities’ ability to hold corporations to 
account, communities may be able to exercise other forms of power. Beyond micro-strategies of resistance, or 
“weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985), other work draws attention to the importance of a vocal and well-
organised civil society to creating broader strategies of corporate accountability (Rodríguez and Camacho 
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2002; Mittelman 1998). Citizens may also exert pressure for answerability and enforceability through informal 
or “soft” sanctions against corporations, though the range of sanctions that can be employed by poor and 
marginalised groups and their effectiveness in practice may be limited. Drawing on factors that have emerged 
from analysis of the case studies, we argue that (i) community “powerlessness” on a number of levels; (ii) the 
range of community employment opportunities or livelihood options; (iii) the heterogeneity of the 
“community”; and (iv) the nature of the relationship between communities and NGOs, unions and others 
who claim to represent them, affect both the responsiveness of companies to community strategies, and the 
representation of communities in spaces for citizen participation as well as in campaigns themselves.  
 
5.1 Community power 
A lack of financial resources limits the types of mechanisms communities can use to hold corporations to 
account. Where communities are socially and politically marginalised they are likely to lack the support of their 
government or elite groups pandering to more powerful coalitions and constituencies. In addition, the 
repeated experience of being left out of decision-making, a lack of skills, confidence, and resources with which 
to negotiate effectively, and the “law of anticipated reactions”, often prevent poorer communities from being 
able to effectively take advantage of those spaces for negotiation that do exist. Where corporations have 
created spaces for participation, weaker sections of the community may be excluded or under-represented. 
Barrientos and Orton (1999) show how negotiations between unions and companies over labour codes often 
fail to involve some of the poorest sections of the workforce that are not adequately represented by the union, 
such as seasonal and women workers. In another example, the participatory element of Rio Tinto’s 
programme to engage with the local community in Madagascar did not, according to Mulligan, include people 
without legal title to land (Mulligan 1999), thus excluding perhaps the most marginalised groups in the 
communities affected by the proposed titanium mine. 
Even where communities secure recognition of their rights, they often lack the power to enforce 
agreements made with the company. For example, in the case of PT Inco in Soroako, Indonesia, the company 
allegedly failed to implement agreements reached with the community in 1979 (Moody 1999). Similarly, in 
Ecuador, communities felt that they should not have negotiated with the oil company Occidental without 
expert help, as there has been a lack of congruence between the words and deeds of the company 
(Kimmerling 2001). While many of the strategies employed by communities may provide effective 
mechanisms of answerability, a community’s lack of power often undermines its ability to secure effective 
mechanisms of enforceability.  
Similarly, a lack of literacy and technical skills can reduce the ability of communities, both to engage in 
meaningful dialogue with corporations and to challenge them about issues of impact on the environment and 
human health. Indigenous and experiential knowledges are often undervalued in attempts to hold 
corporations to account. For example, in Bumpass Cove, USA, local residents had noticed changes to the 
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environment and wildlife caused by toxic dumping. Letters sent by a concerned citizen to the Department of 
Public Health were filed but not acted upon (Merrifield 1993). Processes of systematising people’s own 
knowledge and generating research that addresses peoples’ own concerns through citizen epidemiology can 
begin to counter the exclusion of poorer people from the process of knowledge production (Merrifield 1993). 
Residents of Yellow Creek, Kentucky, USA, suspected that Middlesboro Tanning Company was polluting a 
local river thereby affecting their health. The residents carried out their own health survey, which while 
disputed as a source of sound statistical proof of the impact of pollution on health, served to draw attention 
to the issue, generating wider public concern. It also provided the community with information that they had 
not had before, providing a platform for further campaigning.  
In Maharashtra India, participatory health surveys were produced in response to pollution being 
witnessed and experienced around the Lote-Parashuran Industrial Area, home to a number of large chemical 
companies. The surveys formed the basis of a community learning and capacity building programme, and 
provided the platform for a campaign involving local groups (Saini and Kadam 2001). A national NGO, the 
Society of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) also worked with a local organisation Parivartan to develop a 
“People’s Development Plan” (PDP) after consultations with villages surrounding the chemical industry belt 
in Chiplun. This was presented at a public hearing that brought together community, government and 
corporations to explore ways of reconciling their differences (Newell 2003b). The response of the government 
Pollution Control Board and companies to the PDP included an agreement for compensation for damages 
caused by pollution, a re-evaluation of compensation for land already acquired, and provisional development 
of waste-treatment plans (Saini undated). 
Communities often seek to amplify their power through building alliances with other actors and 
movements that may be in a better position to exert leverage over corporations and governments. For 
example, the Yonggom activists’ role in building a network of international allies in their opposition to the Ok 
Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea was pivotal in generating negative publicity for Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Ltd, who eventually agreed to a substantial out-of-court settlement (Kirsch 1996b). It is important, 
however, not to exaggerate the degree to which company change in the South relies primarily upon Northern-
based pressure. Our analysis of the case studies suggests that community-based strategies can be effective in 
their own right in challenging corporate power on a number of levels. The success of the Maria Elena Cuadra 
Women’s Movement in Nicaragua in helping to secure the passage of a locally developed code of conduct as 
national law in 1998 was a result of local and national campaigning. Over a number of years, the women’s 
movement established internal networks in factories in the non-unionised Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to 
discuss and campaign on worker-related issues and generate broad support for the code of conduct by 
mobilising the general population (Green 1998).  
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Often strategies operate at a more symbolic level. For example, the U’wa people of the cloud forests and 
plains of north-east Colombia, threatened to commit mass suicide following the exploration for oil by 
Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) on land the U’wa claim is theirs. The powerful symbolic resonance of the action 
brought international pressure to bear on Oxy, which is thought to have played a role in the company’s 
decision to abandon the site after only one (failed) test for oil (Vidal 2002b). Borne of a similar frustration 
with the lack of responsiveness of the company to community demands, Nigerian women campaigners from 
the Escravos community in the Niger Delta brought a number of Chevron Texaco’s oil plants to a halt over a 
ten-day period in July 2002 (Olukoya 2002). The women used the threat of a symbolic act of shame, 
threatening to remove their clothes, in order to initiate negotiations with the oil companies (Vidal 2002a). The 
act was successful in creating a space for negotiation with the company over social services and employment 
issues. While strategies that garner international pressure potentially offer the most leverage over TNCs in the 
short term, over the longer term community mobilisation for self-empowerment, challenging dominant 
knowledges and discourses, and developing capacities and self-confidence are important mechanisms for 
countering the more subtle and enduring levels at which corporate power operates.  
 
5.2 Community employment 
Where there are economic alternatives to the activities of a particular corporation, or where the creation of 
alternatives has been a strategy in itself, communities have had some success in demanding CA. In Forest 
County, Wisconsin, USA, the ability of an alliance of Native American groups from three local reservations1 
to generate alternative employment by becoming ‘one of the biggest employers’ in the area, helped to reduce 
demand for mining jobs from the wider community, who had originally been supporters of a mining 
development (Grossman and Gedicks 2001). In Vizag, India, local groups have been exploring livelihood 
alternatives to employment with the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), where few openings have 
been created, despite promises of jobs at the outset in order to secure community support for the plant. Local 
groups such as Sandhana have been looking to develop forms of labour-intensive work using local skills that 
are likely to increase employment opportunities for women in particular (Newell 2003b). 
Often, however, generating alternatives is not a realistic option for communities. In Bangladesh the lack 
of alternative employment for tannery workers and the competition even for such hazardous jobs, has meant 
that workers have little bargaining power. Workers in the Nur Bhai tannery were initially opposed to attempts 
by an NGO to initiate dialogue with the company on issues of worker safety and environmental issues, fearing 
that the company response would be relocation (Asia Foundation, undated). The settlement of the dispute 
over the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, referred to above, demonstrated that, even where a legal 
settlement favoured the indigenous people, dependency upon the company continued in the absence of viable 
                                                 
1  These include the Mole Lake Chippewa (Ojibwe) reservation, the Forest County Potawatomi reservation, and the 
Menominee nation. 
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livelihood alternatives. In August 1999 BHP announced that it regarded the mine as being “incompatible” 
with its environmental values, and that it would enter into negotiations with the Papua New Guinea 
government regarding mine closure (Harkinson 1999). This draws attention to the importance of ex ante 
accountability mechanisms, as in such cases, ex poste mechanisms may be unable to make up for the damage 
caused – with long-term consequences. Agreeing “exit” conditions for mine closure at the outset of the 
project would have been preferable, but the case highlights the difficult trade-offs that communities face. The 
potential closure of the Ok Tedi mine would have dramatic economic repercussions upon the population; 
however, not pursuing such a strategy implies the loss of key livelihood alternatives.  
Where communities have access to alternative employment they are better placed to make accountability 
demands because they can challenge a corporation without risking their livelihoods. Nevertheless, the poorest 
elements within a community are often also the least skilled and therefore, depending on the sector, there may 
be less demand for their labour. In this case, even if other companies operate in the region, their ability to 
make additional demands of a company is significantly reduced. We have already noted that where a company 
feels itself under pressure to commit resources to higher social and environmental standards, it may relocate. 
Reflecting on experiences in the USA, Gaventa notes that ‘increased globalisation meant that communities 
were affected by economic blackmail which pitted poor regions and workers against one another, with threats 
of moving jobs elsewhere if community action became too strong’ (1999: 28). To counter this, groups have 
developed strategies that seek to prevent companies playing workers off against each other. Exposure and 
learning tours have been used to encourage empathy and learning about how workers are being treated by a 
company that has moved abroad, an attempt to break down the resentment that “home” workers often feel 
when a company relocates. One strategy, aimed at forging solidarities between workers in Mexico and in the 
Appalachian south, has been the organisation of study tours so that ‘women who had lost their jobs in the 
Appalachian region could visit their counterparts who had gained similar jobs in . . . the maquiladora region of 
Mexico’ (Gaventa 1999: 33). Similarly, American and Mexican participants learned about the enormous job 
losses in Canada that resulted from corporations moving south to the United States to avoid unions and 
generous social benefits. They note: ‘dialogues among US workers around NAFTA abounded with stories of 
how, in bargaining sessions, management would often use the threat of moving production to Mexico or 
elsewhere to bargain down wages and working conditions in the United States’ (Cavanagh et al. 2001: 153). 
Community exchanges can be effective as a means of facilitating community learning about strategy and 
about other community’s experiences with a company. Current engagements with companies can be informed 
by the company’s previous track-record of acting on its promises and the extent to which it has shown itself 
to be responsive to community concerns in the past (Newell 2003b). Once, again, however, there is the issue 
of the fit between community demands and company capacity to respond to them. In examples such as the 
Nur Bhai tannery in Bangladesh, where the company is small-scale and where profit margins are tight, the onus 
was placed on the NGO to work in partnership with the business to achieve small-scale improvements in 
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worker safety and environmental impact (Asia Foundation, undated). More radical reforms would simply not 
be possible or realistic. In situations such as this, where levels of dependency are so high, engagement in 
promoting company reform is a necessary and important component of a campaigning strategy. While many 
of the factors discussed so far relate to community-corporation relations, internal community dynamics also 
raise issues for the effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA. 
 
5.3 Intra-community relations 
The fact that communities are highly differentiated, non-bounded groups, with differing interests and internal 
power relations, has a number of implications for the effectiveness of community-based strategies. Social and 
environmental problems produced by industrial development may be experienced differently by groups within 
communities. The impact of the Lote-Parshuram industrial development in Maharashtra, India, is argued to 
have had most impact upon dalits and women (Anand, undated: 17). Dalits, as landless agriculturalists in the 
area, received no compensation for loss of livelihood, whereas landowners did. While men lost livelihoods 
associated with fishing and agriculture due to the effects of the pollution, some at least had the opportunity to 
work in the new industries, while women did not. Women who had been active in agriculture and fishing lost 
economic independence following the industrial development, which led to a loss of self-worth and self-
sufficiency (ibid.).  
Different attitudes within the community towards a proposed project provide opportunities for industry 
to adopt a “divide and rule” strategy. Companies can seek to engage with those people willing to cooperate 
and dismiss, or ignore more confrontational views. For example, a legal case brought against Tiomin 
Resources Inc. in Kenya on the grounds of inadequate compensation for lands acquired by the company 
divided the community. Tiomin allegedly capitalised on this, and began to work with those who were 
dissatisfied with the legal approach (Ojiambo 2002: 20). Who is willing, and who is able to take advantage of 
“invited” spaces for participation in corporate decision-making is also dependent upon relations of power 
within communities. For example, a lack of attention by the electricity company WESCO in Kerala, India, to 
the make-up of Village Electrical Committees (VEC) set up to engage stakeholders with the company, led to 
the domination of these spaces by men and by the scheduled castes (Barney et al. 2001). 
Demanded spaces are not necessarily more inclusive. The association of strategies with a particular 
group, even where the issue affects the whole community, presents a problem in this regard. In Buttonwillow, 
Kern County, USA, the campaign against the expansion of the Laidlaw toxic waste facility came to be 
primarily associated with the Latino members of the community, as a core concern became access to 
information and, in particular, the translation of documents from the environmental review process into 
Spanish. In the long term, this undermined the strength of the campaign, by limiting the appeal to non-
Spanish speaking residents, despite the fact that the campaign issues affected the whole community (Cole and 
Foster 2002: 93). While demanded spaces are sometimes claimed to be exclusionary as a result of the process 
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of identity formation to build a common purpose (Cornwall 2002), in this case it was the reverse, as non-
Spanish speaking residents were reluctant to get involved with Spanish speakers at a time when anti-immigrant 
issues were high-profile (Cole and Foster 2002). Being involved in such struggles can, therefore, serve to 
entrench power inequalities within communities with the result that gains made may accrue to some members 
of the community more than others. Among the rubber tappers in Brazil, Campbell (1996) found that, unlike 
men, women felt that their lives had changed little since the movement began. One woman explained: ‘In this 
movement, the seringueiro [male rubber tapper], got free of the boss man, but the mulher seringueira [female 
rubber tapper] didn’t get free from her boss – her husband’ (1996: 52). 
Issues of community difference demonstrate the importance of mechanisms to ensure the participation 
of a range of groups, and in particular more marginalised groups. Local or national NGOs often take on roles 
as advocates for marginalised people, and may seek to increase the access of these groups to participatory 
spaces. Given that power dynamics also influence the capacity of people to exert influence within such spaces, 
NGOs often also try to build capacity and self-confidence and to lobby for specialist facilitation techniques 
which can take account of differences in capacity and confidence. While the commitment of many NGOs to 
social justice and community development often makes them the appropriate bodies to perform such roles, 
there are also a number of issues surrounding community-NGO relations that may serve to undermine the 
effectiveness of community-based strategies for CA. 
 
5.4 Community-NGO relations 
Undoubtedly, NGOs can play a unique role in promoting CA to poorer and more marginalised groups, 
through their ability to garner public trust and to employ the ‘mobilisation of shame’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) 
against powerful corporations. However, a growing body of literature draws attention to the importance of 
NGO’s own accountability and legitimacy when they perform such functions (Edwards and Hulme 1995). 
National and international NGOs are themselves powerful actors in comparison to many of the local 
communities on whose behalf they campaign, raising the issue of the potential for the “webs” of 
accountability that exist between communities and NGOs, and between NGOs, their donors, and their 
members, to pull in competing directions. 
In a number of cases, the involvement of NGOs may have served to reduce the responsiveness of 
corporations to community campaigns. For example, the Western Mining Corporation (WMC) was able to use 
the fact that a number of environmental groups, including the Conservation Council and Friends of the Earth, 
were closely involved with Aboriginal opponents of the development of the Olympic Dam mine in South 
Australia to question the legitimacy of the campaign. The company objected to negotiating with groups on the 
basis that they were “cronies” of the ENGOs, even though the majority of the community representatives 
favoured the ENGOs’ stance on the mine (Ali 2000: 88).  
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Perhaps of more concern are issues surrounding the inclusivity of NGO-led alliances. There are 
questions concerning the extent to which they include the local population, or of how representative they are 
of differences within the local population. While the influence of ActionAid Kenya was effective in 
influencing both the Kenyan government and Tiomin Resources to attend roundtable discussions about the 
proposed titanium mine, some claim that this was achieved at the expense of ensuring the participation of the 
local community, who were unable to attend (Ojiambo 2002: 31). Given that the direct representation of 
previously marginalised people is an aim of citizen participation, the failure of these meetings to include 
members of the affected community undermined their effectiveness as inclusive mechanisms of 
accountability. 
Research in Mexico by Hughes (2002) demonstrated that NGO claims to speak on behalf of poor or 
marginalised groups may disguise conflicts between them. Hughes examined the differing attitudes towards a 
benefit-sharing agreement reached between indigenous communities and the TNC Sandoz (now Novartis). 
While the communities considered their experience with the company generally positive and felt that the 
agreement contributed to the communities’ longer-term sustainable development, the agreement was criticised 
by national and international NGOs for the misappropriation of indigenous knowledge (Hughes 2002: 104). 
While the communities were eager to take advantage of commercial benefits arising from the use of their 
resources in what they considered to be a sustainable way, for the NGO, which considered the 
commercialisation of indigenous knowledge to be a problem in itself, the case represented a violation of the 
environment and knowledge rights of indigenous communities (Hughes 2002: 106).  
Local concerns for employment may also conflict with NGO agendas. In Wavecrest, South Africa, 
opposition to a proposed heavy mineral mine came both from within the locally affected Xhosa tribes, and 
also from the Wildlife and Environment Society, a national ENGO (Hamann 2001). However, the community 
position on the mine was divided. Opponents of the mine were generally elder, male cattle-owners, while 
other community members, who stood to gain from the employment opportunities of the mine, were more 
open to negotiation. However, according to Hamann, in its campaign against the proposed development, to 
which community opposition gave credibility and legitimacy, the ENGO presented a misleading image of a 
community united against the mine (Hamann 2001), effectively excluding community members who had an 
interest in the proposed developments. 
Thus, there is a balance to strike between the benefits and risks of NGO involvement in community 
campaigns. International and national NGOs may provide much needed leverage to promote corporate 
responsiveness. Similarly, the resources, capacity-building and technical expertise that many NGOs can draw 
upon to assist community mobilisation can be important in promoting responsiveness. However, in order to 
ensure their “outsider” status does not undermine the credibility of community campaigns, NGOs should 
ensure that their own processes of decision-making are transparent and accountable, and that they foster 
strong  links  both to  the community,  and across different  groups within  the community.  The most effective 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the influence of community-related factors on effectiveness 
Factor Influences:  Strategies 
 Responsiveness Representation  
Community 
power 
Lack of financial power  
 
Lack of power to enforce 
agreements 
 
Undervaluing of citizen 
knowledges 
 
Exclusion  
 
Undervaluing of citizen 
knowledges 
International networks and 
alliances 
 
Local and national alliances 
 
Local knowledge, health 
surveys 
 
Community protests 
 
Legal action 
 
Symbolic activities 
Community 
employment 
Alternative economic 
activity/employment  
 
Lack of alternative 
employment 
 
Corporate activity further 
increases dependency by 
destroying alternatives 
 
 Generation of economic 
alternatives 
 
Alliances of workers in the 
same company 
 
Community exchanges 
Intra-
community 
relations 
Community differences 
may divide the strength 
of strategies 
 
Companies may use 
community divisions to 
undermine the 
legitimacy of groups 
opposing the company 
Framing of campaign 
may exclude some 
groups 
 
Companies may exploit 
differences to exclude 
non-cooperative groups  
 
Community relations of 
power determine which 
groups may dominate 
spaces of citizenship 
participation 
NGO capacity and 
confidence-building 
 
NGO advocacy for poorer 
and more marginalised 
groups 
Community-
NGO relations 
Strong NGO links to and 
within the community 
 
“Outsider” status of NGO 
may reduce corporate 
responsiveness 
 
Community-NGO aims 
may conflict 
Strong NGO links to 
and within the 
community 
 
NGO transparency and 
accountability 
 
NGO focus on getting 
response may limit 
inclusion of community 
 
Community-NGO aims 
may conflict 
NGO attention to 
transparency and 
accountability 
 
Local capacity-building and 
ownership 
 
 
Note: In columns two and three, normal text refers to decreasing effectiveness; text in italics refers to increased 
effectiveness. 
 34 
strategies in terms of both corporate responsiveness and community representation are therefore those that 
combine the skills and resources of NGOs with the mobilisation, capacity-building and local community 
ownership. The “liberal” CSR approach to “tri-sector partnerships” often fails to make a distinction between 
NGO and community, and therefore risks overlooking issues regarding representation, and the extent to 
which the partnerships are inclusive of the community concerned.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The community-based factors which impact on the effectiveness of strategies for corporate accountability 
include the extent to which: (i) communities have the capacity to engage with national and international 
networks that are sensitive to local priorities; (ii) the capacity of citizens to engage in long-term locally 
“empowering” activities such as citizen epidemiology, People’s Development Plans and the like; (iii) the extent 
to which differing groups within communities have the capacity to engage in campaigns and to benefit from 
their outcomes; and (iv) the capacity of communities to maintain control and ownership over local campaigns, 
and whether they can demand accountability and transparency from their national and international NGO 
allies. These factors are summarised in Table 5.1.  
 
6  Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated how a number of interrelated contexts influence the effectiveness of 
community-based strategies for corporate accountability to the poor. These demonstrate both the numerous 
challenges communities face in holding to account institutions that affect their lives, and the range of 
innovative strategies that have been employed to confront these challenges. It has been argued that 
accountability – in terms of answerability and enforceability – is influenced by a number of interrelated state-, 
company- and community-related factors.  
These factors do not have a hierarchy of relevance, but rather are multifaceted and work in conjunction 
with one another. Where there is a lack of state support for community rights and claims, or where the rights 
of corporations are protected at the expense of their responsibilities, the relationship between the community 
and the company takes on more importance. The level of corporate power, vulnerability to citizen strategies, 
and attitude towards citizen participation therefore become key. An important determinant of the 
responsiveness of corporations will also be the forms of community power deployed, the extent to which they 
can draw on national and international NGO support, and the level of community economic (in)dependence 
vis-à-vis corporations. NGOs can play a key role in representing the most vulnerable groups in this regard, and 
in mediating conflict between different groups. Their legitimacy to perform this role, in turn, relies on their 
own accountability to the communities they are negotiating on behalf of.  
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However, in many cases, change has also resulted from local and national mobilisation using a range of 
strategies, including negotiation, protest, and litigation. Such strategies have been shown to be complementary; 
direct action or litigation often create the incentives for corporations to engage in more co-optive strategies. 
Confrontational strategies may also act, to some extent, as sanctions for the non-enforcement of agreements 
made between corporations and communities. However, ensuring the latter has been found to be the most 
difficult aspect of CA for community-based strategies to obtain. 
These findings build upon emerging research in the area of CSR. They support some of the findings 
regarding the vulnerability of TNCs to citizen pressure. However, while accepting emphasis upon Northern-
based NGOs and consumer pressure in driving corporate responsiveness, this paper has also demonstrated 
that local level strategies and agency is important. The findings also confirm many of the lessons suggested in 
the accountability literature regarding factors that impinge upon the effectiveness of accountability strategies 
(Newell and Bellour 2002), such as the importance of legal frameworks (and their interpretation) and state and 
citizen sanctions. In particular, decisions made by the state about whether or not to implement different legal 
rights and responsibilities and whether or not to sanction misconduct are key to CA. Equally, the ability of 
communities to use the law to their advantage and as one tool for the realisation of their rights is central to 
CA in practice. Inevitably for this, and other reasons outlined in this paper, the success of community-based 
strategies for corporate accountability is conditional upon the right combination of contexts and strategies 
adopted by other state, civil society, and corporate actors. This may explain higher levels of success in 
achieving a level of answerability from corporations, than in guaranteeing enforcement of accountability 
measures. 
This paper has found that with regards to citizen participation, issues of access and representation, 
control and framing and recognition of alternative knowledges are important in both corporate engagement 
with communities and in NGO relations to communities they claim to represent. It has supported Cornwall’s 
(2002) claim that demanded spaces are not necessarily more inclusive by virtue of initiation from below. The 
role of NGOs in representing and mediating community claims, and in helping to promote capacity to engage, 
is therefore crucial.  
It is clear that factors influencing the effectiveness of CA to the poor are multiple, complex and tightly 
interconnected. Community-based strategies are therefore necessarily diverse and contingent upon the 
particular, context-specific balance between political, economic and social factors. They tend to be multi-
pronged approaches, in order to address the range of conditions they face. This paper does not set out a neat 
checklist of factors partnered with strategies. Rather, it has attempted to identify a series of state-based, 
company-based and community-based factors that help to account for the conditions in which community-
based strategies for corporate accountability are likely to be more effective. This brings to debates on CSR, 
therefore, a clearer sense of the everyday contexts in which people in majority world settings are fighting to 
secure accountability from investors with whom they are working on an increasing basis. The findings of this 
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paper, based on the “factor framework” we have developed, are merely a starting point for what we hope will 
be an important and timely research agenda centred on how the poor may seek to develop their own strategies 
and mechanisms of accountability from the corporations they work with and for.  
It should be clear that we are not assuming that community-based strategies are the “magic bullet” for 
achieving higher levels of corporate accountability to the poor. We have made clear that we believe that there 
is much that states, corporations and civil society can and should be doing to advance this agenda. But while 
civil regulation and self-regulation may bring about certain gains for the poor, they are limited as a viable 
global model for corporate regulation and accountability. Attempts to strengthen state-based regulation are to 
be welcomed but take time, so that in the meantime it is inevitable that in the absence of a more supportive 
enabling environment, communities will continue to develop their own innovative strategies to enhance the 
accountability of the corporations they host. We therefore conclude that more emphasis is required in debates 
about the role of corporations in development on the state, company, and community-based factors that 
affect the relations of accountability between communities and corporations. This paper has attempted to 
contribute to an understanding of these factors and how, when and why they are important in practice. 
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